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Abstract
The ability to successfully bind features and objects at different levels of abstraction is
important for everyday functioning of memory. The current study examined how actions and
emotional arousal influence item recognition and between-item binding across two experiments.
According to the Arousal-Biased Competition Theory (ABC; Mather and Sutherland, 2011),
binding can be enhanced by emotional arousal, depending upon what is the focus of attention
within a scene. In the current study, participants viewed a series of slides, each of which depicted
a person performing an action with an object, as well as an object that is not interacted with. All
of the actions performed were emotionally neutral. According to ABC, this difference between
attended and non-attended items should be enhanced when in the presence of an emotionally
arousing stimulus. In the current experiments, emotional arousal was manipulated using sounds
presented before slides depicting a person performing an action using an object. In Experiment 1,
actions led to enhanced attention to (and better item memory for) manipulated objects relative to
objects that were not the focus of attention. Participants also gave higher confidence ratings for
recognized interacted objects than recognized non-interacted objects. However, the predicted
interaction between emotional arousal and item type was not obtained. The one impact of
emotional arousal was that participants responded more conservatively to faces and items
associated with a negative sound. In Experiment 2, there was no evidence for enhanced
associative memory as a function of either emotion or action, although overall performance was
very poor. The implications of these findings for theoretical views of memory are discussed, as
well as future directions for research.
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Introduction
Events are encoded and stored in the brain not as a movie of the event, but as pieces of
information, which are then put together to form cohesive perception of an event (Buckner,
2003; Koutstaal & Cavendish, 2006; Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998; Shiffrin, 2003).
Different attributes of an event, such as emotion and movement, can impact how this process
occurs and determine what is remembered about an event. There are times when accuracy for
details of an event and how these details fit together would be critical to know. For example, if
you witness a crime, it would be useful to know, not only what the victim, the assailant, and the
weapon looked like, but how all of those items related to each other. This type of cohesive,
detailed memory relies on binding together the aspects of the scene (e.g., Meiser & Bröder,
2002). Often, it is difficult to recall such information precisely because attention may be fixated
a particular item that is relevant to the witness, causing other objects in the scene to be poorly
encoded (Mather & Sutherland, 2011).
The current study set out to identify whether characteristics of a scene influence binding
of objects. First, I discuss how binding of events occurs and how successful binding is inferred in
the laboratory. Then, I discuss two facets of a scene that can impact binding: emotion and action.
Finally, I explain how these two aspects can work together to enhance binding and discuss a
series of studies to test this at both the feature and between-object level.
Evidence for Binding
The earliest empirical and theoretical work on binding focused on how different features
of objects were bound together at the time of perception. The feature-integration theory of
Treisman and Gelade (1980) argues that features are processed automatically, and
simultaneously, early in perception. However, object recognition takes place later, after features
that must be bound together are attended serially. If focal attention is inhibited or disrupted,
1

illusory conjunctions can form, causing the perceiver to attribute a feature of an object to a
different object (Treisman, 1977). In particular, when there is no overarching constraint to serve
as a template for the features, illusory conjunctions can arise because inattention causes improper
binding of features into objects (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Illusory conjunctions are an
example of binding-gone-wrong, but demonstrate the importance of attention during object
recognition.
Researchers have also been interested in whether binding is present in long-term memory
representations. Studies on the topic have attempted to measure binding in a number of ways.
For instance, binding is thought to occur to the extent that a test cue (a feature from the encoding
context) enhances retrieval of a related detail (e.g., Hollingworth, 2007; Starns & Hicks, 2005,
2008). If one feature cues the retrieval of another, it is thought that the features were
associatively bound together. If they were not, then a cue feature that was previously presented
with the target feature would be no more effective at enhancing retrieval than a randomly
presented cue, or no cue. Similarly, if changing features of an object or a scene at test impairs
memory performance (i.e., modifying available cues), this is also thought to provide evidence of
binding (e.g., Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Hollingworth, 2007). A well-known example of such
research examines the effect of changing the environmental context between encoding and test
(e.g., Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Smith, 1979). A third type of evidence is provided by research
that examines the relationship between the retrieval of one feature or item and the retrieval of
another (e.g., Fisher & Cuervo, 1983; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Wells & Leippe, 1981). For
example, Meiser & Bröder found that, for words recognized at test, memory for the font color
and location on a computer screen were highly correlated, which they interpreted as evidence of
binding.
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One question that has been debated in the literature is whether existing studies provide
good evidence that within-object (feature-to-feature) binding occurs in memory. Although the
correlational evidence noted above has been argued to be evidence of binding, such correlations
can be observed without within-feature binding having occurred. For example, research suggests
that features are not bound to each other, but are instead bound to the object they are a part of
(Starns & Hicks, 2005; 2008). If features are bound to each other, in addition to the object,
mutual cuing should occur such that the reinstatement of a feature would facilitate the retrieval
of the associated feature, regardless if the object is present or not. This mutual cuing hypothesis
is contrasted with the binding variability hypothesis. The binding variability hypothesis states
that successful retrieval of one feature is positively correlated with successful retrieval of related
features, but the correlation is dependent on the varying strength of memory for the object, to
which these features are independently bound. In other words, while successful retrieval of one
feature is correlated with retrieval of another, this is due to the strength of memory for the object
and not necessarily the level of binding between features. Starns and Hicks (2005; 2008) found
support for the binding variability hypothesis. Participants were cued with a feature of an item
(e.g. its location) and were asked to recognize the associated feature (e.g. its color). When the
object was not present to serve as a cue for both features, reinstating one feature did not enhance
retrieval of the related feature (Starns & Hicks, 2008).
Starns and Hicks’ (2008) research also provided an important improvement to existing
methods that have been used to examine binding. They noted that many previous studies have
the original object available as a cue at test. For example, at test, the studied word may be
presented in red ink and the participant needs to determine where on the screen the word was
located. They argue that participants are not recalling other features of an object because the
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feature serving as a cue facilitated retrieval. Instead, they are simply recalling the object and all
features associated with it. While Starns and Hicks (2008), among others (Meiser & Bröder,
2002) examined feature-level, or within-item binding, the same procedure can be used to
examine binding between multiple objects, as well as objects and background, in complex
scenes, or between-item binding. For example, Martin (2013) showed participants a series of
complex scenes that contained a variety of objects (e.g., a living room scene). In Experiment 1,
at test, the scene was not presented in its entirety. Instead, participants received no-object cue
and object-cued trials. The former provided only a marker on a blurred version of the
background to indicate what object should be selected. The latter still included a target marker on
a blurred background, but also included three, clearly presented objects in their original
locations. Experiment 2 was similar, but utilized an intact background to examine object-context
binding. Across experiments, Martin (2013) found evidence for both object-object binding and
object-context binding.
In addition to behavioral data, there is evidence for associative binding of features and
objects in the neurological literature as well. Uncapher, Otten, and Rugg (2006) observed activity
in the intra-parietal sulcus related only to successful encoding of multiple features using a
procedure adapted from Starns and Hicks (2005) in which participants encoded words in
different colors and locations and were later asked to recall them. These findings lend credence
to the hypothesis that features must be bound into a singular representation when an event is first
encoded. Similar findings have been found at the object level as well. Hollingworth (2007)
manipulated scenes that included a complex background and multiple features (i.e. a living room
scene) or a blank screen with objects positioned around the screen. Participants were required to
detect the change in the scene or array at test, which consisted of no change, replacement, left-

4

right mirror reflected, or changed position. Across nine experiments, Hollingworth (2007)
observed a same-position advantage when context was present and when the target object was in
the same position relative to the other objects. If associative binding did not occur between the
target object and the surrounding context, these advantageous effects would not have been
observed.
Overall, the evidence does seem to suggest, at both at a neurological and a behavioral
level, that representations of features are bound together in memory. However, the mechanisms
involved in binding are likely to be influenced by where people focus their attention (e.g.,
Martin, 2013). In the context of dynamic real-world events, such focus is likely to be influenced
by a number of factors including actions and emotional arousal. I discuss these factors, and their
potential influence on binding, in the following sections.
Impact of Action on Memory
Action is an attentional magnet that can divert resources away from other objects within a
scene. Although motion can be preferentially attended to, several studies have shown that the
onset of action causes automatic attentional capture to a moving item (Abrams & Christ, 2003;
Abrams & Christ, 2006; Hillstrom & Yantis, 1994). For example, in Abrams and Christ (2003),
participants were asked to find target letters that were either moving prior to the task, started
moving during the task, or remained still. Although motion overall did not provide an advantage
for finding target letters, the onset of motion, compared to other types of motion (i.e.
deceleration or no motion), resulted in faster identification of the target letter. Other researchers
(Franconeri & Simons, 2005) have argued that motion always provides attentional capture, but
this finding appears to only hold in highly constrained circumstances, namely when action occurs
in a spatial location previously unoccupied by an item (Abrams & Christ, 2006). Abrams and
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Christ (2003, 2006) suggested that onset of motion captures attention to a greater extent than
motion already taking place because onset of movement of an item tends to be more important
than an item already in motion. In the context of events, this suggests that actions might draw our
attention towards the component elements involved in the action (the performer and any objects
involved). But how will this influence memory for the events?
There is relatively little research on long-term memory for actions. There is some
evidence to suggest that visual long-term memory (VLTM) stores “high fidelity” representations
of viewed actions (Urgolites & Wood, 2013a). Although actions may be well-remembered, there
is some evidence suggesting that this may come at a cost to memory for context, at least in some
circumstances. In research by Urgolites and Wood (2013b), participants viewed action-scene
pairs and later recalled either the scene or action separately, or together. It was found that
participants were able to accurately recall either context or action, but lacked the ability to
accurately associate the two. This finding suggests that action might reduce memory binding.
However, this is not necessarily the case. The biased competition models of attention (e.g., Beck
& Kastner, 2009) that motivate ABC theory predict that salient aspects of an event will be
enhanced at the expense of less salient aspects. There was nothing in the Urgolites and Wood
(2013b) scenes that would have denoted salience insofar as there was nothing in the scenes that
cued the participants that they should have paid attention to contextual details. In this situation,
action may have served as an attentional magnet at the expense of surrounding contextual
information. Thus, existing work in this area does not rule out that memory binding might be
present under the right conditions. Furthermore, these studies have only examined memory for
the background. It is not clear whether actions influence memory for objects or the people that
perform them, either individually or together as unit. One can hypothesize that actions could
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serve as a means to integrate the performer, the action, and the associated action into a single
representation. In other words, actions might increase memory binding of the constituent
elements. It is also possible that actions might draw attention to individual elements (e.g., to the
person or the object involved), and subsequently enhancing item memory.
To summarize, action can serve as an attentional magnet, capturing attention via bottomup processes. Actions themselves are also well-remembered in LTM (e.g., Urgolites & Wood,
2013a). What is less clear is how actions influence memory for items related to the action, or for
the associative relationship between the items (binding). In Experiment 1, I examined how
actions influence item memory, and in Experiment 2, I examined how actions influence
associative binding. Both experiments examined the additional influence of emotional arousal in
enhancing observed effects.
Impact of Emotion on Memory
Emotion is an important element of both everyday experiences, as well as more unique
situations such eyewitness events. Furthermore, emotion is an important influence on what
information is remembered (e.g Kensinger, 2007; 2009). Researchers typically describe emotion
as involving two components: valence and arousal (e.g. Mather, 2007). Valence denotes how
positive or negative a stimulus is and arousal denotes how physically stimulating a stimulus is.
However, most research on the topic of emotion and memory focuses exclusively on negatively
emotional arousing stimuli (Mather, 2007), and this focus will similarly be adopted in the
proposed studies.
Emotional arousal is often described as an attentional magnet, causing a narrowing effect that
draws attention to the emotional item, enhancing memory (Easterbrook, 1959). Research on the
impact of negatively emotionally arousing stimuli on memory has found positive, negative, and
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null effects (e.g., Mather, 2007). It has been argued that emotion may bolster memory because
emotional stimuli are considered a higher priority than a neutral stimulus. As such, some
research has shown that emotional items are preferentially bound to their context, creating a lack
of resources to bind neutral items within the same scene (MacKay & Ahmetzanov, 2005). In
contrast, because arousal impairs hippocampal functioning, which aids in memory consolidation
and the integration of items, associative binding ability should be impaired as well (Murray &
Kensinger, 2013). However, item memory should remain intact because of increased arousal by
way of increased amygdala functioning (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Radley & Morrison, 2005).
There are two theories that attempt to rectify discrepancies within the literature and propose
when memory will be enhanced and when it will be impaired by emotional content. In the first,
Mather (2007) suggests an object-based framework that focuses on what is interpreted and
grouped as an “object” to discern how emotion will affect representations of objects. According
to Mather (2007), within-object (feature) binding should be enhanced by arousal at encoding
because the arousing nature of the stimuli narrows and focuses attention (Mather & Knight,
2006; Nashiro & Mather, 2011). While features of an item and overall item memory may be
enhanced, Mather (2007) predicts that associations between an emotional and a neutral item
should either be impaired or the emotion should have no effect. While some research does show
this pattern of findings (e.g. Nashiro & Mather, 2011), others have found that between-item
binding is enhanced in the presence of emotional arousal, even under divided attention (e.g.,
Guillet & Arndt, 2009; Maddox, Naveh-Benjamin, Old, & Kilb 2012).
The Arousal-Biased Competition (ABC) theory was put forth by Mather and Sutherland
(2011) to explain the contradictory evidence found in the literature; and to provide a better
explanatory framework. Critically, Mather and Sutherland (2011) addressed a major issue in how
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emotional memory is typically studied. In a number of studies noted above, memory was
examined in situations where an emotional item was essentially competing with a neutral item
for attentional resources. In this case, emotion should detract from between-item binding because
of its attentional narrowing properties and enhance within-item binding. But, in other situations,
one can expect enhancement of between-object binding. As will be discussed below, the
predictions of ABC vary depending on stimuli relevance (i.e., what aspects are the focus of
attention at encoding).
ABC Theory. First, ABC expands upon biased-competition models of attention. ABC
argues that arousal moderates the strength of representations at the perceptual and encoding level
all the way through consolidation and retrieval (Mather & Sutherland, 2011). Enhancement
occurs for aspects of a stimulus or scene that are prioritized for either bottom-up (e.g., perceptual
salience) or top-down (goal-relevant) reasons. ABC theory of attention assumes that
representations compete for visual processing resources, such that the greater the neural
activation in response to an object, the greater the decrease in activation for another object within
the field of view. In addition, ABC posits that arousal should enhance both bottom-up and topdown priority. Bottom-up processing is the processing of the environment without any prior
schematic representation. This is the process that is responsible for automatic shifts in attention
to salient items in a scene. For example, a loud noise automatically draws attention to the source
of the noise. Similarly, a red letter in an array of black letters stands out to a viewer because of
its attention-grabbing nature, generating the “pop-out” effect. The latter, top-down, is an
enhancement to stimuli that stems from internal goals and expectations about the world. For
example, when someone is looking for a friend in a crowd they have the intention of finding that
person. Both of these processes work together to orient attention.
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ABC posits that as long as the arousing information is not in competition with the stimuli
observed, then it should not negatively impact the processing and later retrieval of neutral
information that is present at the time of encoding. More generally, ABC says that objects that
are the focus of attention should receive greater activation, while objects that are not the focus of
attention will receive less activation. In order to prevent competition, an emotional stimulus can
be part of the to-be remembered information, or, it can be in a separate modality. For example,
Zeelenberg and Bocanegra (2010) used multiple modalities to determine if emotional arousing
stimuli interfere with neutral stimuli. Participants either heard or read an emotional or neutral
word. After this word, participants always read a neutral word. Enhancement for memory for the
always-read neutral word was found only when it was paired with an emotional auditory word.
Auditory neutral words had no effect and visually presented emotional words impaired memory
for the visually presented neutral word (caused by same modality interference). In this situation,
associative binding between the emotional auditory stimulus and the visual word had occurred to
create a singular representation, creating an enhancement effect because the auditory stimulus
did not interfere with the visual stimulus.
The ABC Theory put forth by Mather and Sutherland (2011) suggests that what is bound
at perception and encoding, and subsequently retrieved, depends on what is important and salient
in a scene. This importance, whether signaled by top-down or bottom-up influences, is
moderated by arousal, which enhances the differences between salient and non-salient
information. In this manner, emotional arousal can, depending on the conditions, potentially
enhance item memory or associative binding depending on what type of information is of central
importance. As mentioned previously, one type of potential influence of salience in complex
events involves action.
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The Current Study
The current study examined the influence of action and emotional arousal on item
memory and associative binding. As described later in greater detail, the stimuli consisted of two
slides (a pair) depicting an actor, an action, an interacted object, and a non-interacted object. In
the first experiment, participants studied sets of pairs of an actor performing a neutral action. The
scene included an object that was used by the actor, and an object that was not. At the onset of
the slides, participants heard either a neutral or negative sound (Ponzio & Mather, 2011). After a
5-minute delay filled with a Sudoku, participants were given a recognition test. Participants saw
a sequential presentation of a mix of target items, which were either an object in the scene, the
actor, or the lures of the objects and actors. Participants were tested on each object type (or its
lure) for each scene. Participants then made an old/new recognition judgment for each item
presented, as well as a confidence judgment. It was predicted that actions would enhance item
memory for the elements of scenes related to the action (interacted objects) relative to noninteracted objects. Consistent with ABC theory (Mather & Sutherland, 2011), it was predicted
that emotionally arousing sounds would enhance this difference, enhancing memory for “central”
elements of the scene and reducing memory for the “peripheral” aspect.
Experiment 2 was almost identical, except that participants received an associative
recognition test. In this experiment, one of the objects was used as a cue for the actor and was
presented clearly, with the remainder of the scene blurred. Although I discuss the hypotheses in
more detail in the introduction to the second experiment, it was expected that actions would
enhance memory binding, with emotional arousal increasing these effects.
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Experiment 1: Methods
Participants
A power analysis for Experiment 1 was computed using G*power (Faul, Erdfelder,
Buchner, & Lang, 2009). The analysis suggested that the amount of participants need to achieve
80% power was 138. This analysis assumed: a 2 (sound type) x 4 (target type) within-subjects
ANOVA an ES f of 0.10 (small effect size f); a type 1 error rate of 0.05; and an estimated 0.50
correlation between measures. Participants were students taking psychology courses at Louisiana
State University and received course credit for their participation. A total of 130 students
participated.
Experimental Design
This experiment utilized a 2 (sound type: emotional or neutral) x 4 (target type: actor,
interacted object, non-interacted object, lure) within-subjects ANOVA. Sounds were either
emotional or neutral. That is, the emotional content of the scene came from the nature of the
sounds and not the actions or objects. The dependent variable was item memory, as assessed
using proportion of accuracy responses and signal detection theory (SDT) measures d’ and C.
Stimuli
Study phase slides. A series of 36 slide pairs were used for the current study. Each pair
consisted of: A start scene in which an actor is reaching for an object and an action scene in
which they are performing an action (see Figure 1 for an example).

Figure 1. Example of a study pair.
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Each pair contained two objects, one that was interacted with and one that was not. These objects
were similar in nature, such that each action can be performed with either item in the scene
(across the experiment, each was performed with an action equally often). For example, in
Figure 1, both the softball and the football can be tossed into the air. In addition, the background
was different for each scene to later serve as a cue during testing. Since the general context was
identical for each pair, it was necessary to give an additional cue to discern what “event”
participants were supposed to recall (Martin, 2013). In the current study, the relevant stimuli are
the acted-upon objects.
Test phase. Each participant was tested on 108 total items, 54 old, 54 new. These were
evenly divided across the item times; 36 faces, 36 interacted objects, and 36 non-interacted
objects. Both targets and lures were presented in a randomized order. Lures were objects similar
in appearance to items that the participants actually saw, but differed in terms of a critical
feature. For example, if a participant saw a red stapler, the lure was a blue stapler. The face lures
consisted of faces normed on similarity for an actually presented face (See Figure 2 for an
example). These items were equally divided among emotional and neutral action scenes.
Participants made an item judgment and a confidence judgment for each pair. Confidence was
rated on a 1-7 Likert-type scale. A value of 1 meant “not at all confident,” while a value of 7
meant “extremely confident.”

a.

b.

c.

d.

Figure 2. An example of test items and their lures in Experiment 1. From left to right, old object
(a), lure object (b), old face (c), and lure face (d).
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Sounds. Participants heard negative or neutral sounds before viewing the slide pairs.
These sounds were presented just prior to study slide onset and lasted for approximately 5s. The
sounds are from the International Affective Digital Sounds (IADS) database. They are normed
for valence and arousal on 1-7 scales, corresponding to increasing level of intensity for each
facet. The negative sounds used are approximately a “5” on the rating scales. The neutral sounds
are approximately a “3.”
Procedure
The procedure was divided into a study phase and a testing phase.
Study phase. Participants were told that they would see a series of slide pairs and that
they should attempt to remember the scene in its entirety because they will be tested on the
information in the pairs later. Each pair was preceded by a fixation cross, which was presented
for 1 second. Each scene of the pair appeared sequentially and stayed on screen for 500ms,
totaling 1 second per pair. In addition to viewing the 36 slide pairs, each slide pair was
associated with either a neutral or a negative sound that played for 5s prior to the onset of the
slides. There was an ISI of 3s between each slide set. After the study phase was completed,
instructions appeared on the screen to wait for the experimenter. After all participants were
finished, they were given the instructions for the filler task.
Testing phase. After a 5-minute delay filled with a Sudoku puzzle, participants were
presented with a series of test items that were a mix of correct targets and lures. Participants were
tested on all facets of a scene. That is, participants were test on the actor face, the non-interacted
object, and the interacted object (or their lure counterparts). Participants were tested on half lures
and half old items, divided evenly by emotion type. Participants made a yes/no recognition

14

judgment. Participants also made confidence judgments on a 1-7 scale after they made their
decision. After the testing phase was completed, they were verbally debriefed.
Variability in number of item types. Due to a programming error, participants early in
data collection (n = 66) encountered different numbers of items of each type (e.g., the number of
items seen with an emotionally arousing sound versus a neutral sound). These differences were
generally small, and were accommodated in the final analysis by computing proportion of
responses per item type. Later participants completed a revised program that did not have these
issues.
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Experiment 1: Results and Discussion
Analysis and Results
Although there were three item types – faces, interacted objects, and non-interacted
objects – the critical hypotheses focused on the difference between the latter two item types. For
that reason, memory for faces was examined separately (described below). Signal Detection
Theory (SDT) measures of recognition memory include discrimination (d’) and response bias
(C). The key predictions for this study concerned the impact of the key variable on d’. Although
there were no a priori predictions of these variables on response bias, I report this measure
below for the sake of completeness (See Table 1). Item memory was assessed using
Table 1: Mean d’ and C for items divided by valence. Neg=Negative, Neu=Neutral.
d’
C

NegIO
0.313
[0.2,0.43]
-0.10
[-0.17,0.03]

NegNIO
0.25
[0.14,0.40]
0.43
[0.34,0.52]

NegFace
0.42
[-0.08,0.21]
0.19
[0.12,0.28]

NeuIO
0.34
[0.23,0.50]
-0.17
[-0.22,-0.13]

NeuNIO
0.17
[0.07,0.28]
0.42
[0.33,0.50]

NeuFace
0.36
[-0.08,0.21]
-0.01
[0.12,0.28]

signal detection (SDT) measures (d’ and C), and analyzed using 2 (sound type: negative/neutral)
x 2 (Item type: interacted/non-interacted) within-subjects ANOVAs. For d’, a measure of
sensitivity, only a main effect of item type was found, F(1,129)=4.26, p<0.05, p2 =0.032.
Supporting one of my hypotheses, interacted objects (M=0.33) were remembered better than
non-interacted objects (M=0.21). The main effect of valence and the interaction was not
significant. For C, a measure of response bias, a main effect of item type was found,
F(1,129)=183.168, p<0.01, p2 =0.60. Participants responded more liberally to interacted objects
(M=-0.14) than to non-interacted objects (M=0.24). There was also a main effect of valence,
F(1,129)=4.00, p<0.05, p2 =0.03. Participants responded more conservatively to items
associated with a negative sound (M=0.17), than to items associated with a neutral sound
16

(M=0.12). The other hypothesis, based on ABC Theory, was not supported. Despite this, valence
did influence behavior, as noted in the response bias measures.
While not the focus of Experiment 1, exploratory analyses on d’ and C for faces were
performed. Again, participant memory was not enhanced under emotional arousal, t(129)=0.855,
p>0.30. However, paralleling the object data, participants responded more conservatively to
faces paired with a negative sound (M=0.20) than faces paired with a neutral sound (M=-0.01),
t(129)=4.78, p>0.01.
I also assessed confidence in responses to Hits and FA (See Table 2 for means). ConTable 2: Mean hits and FAs for items. IO= interacted objects, NIO= non-interacted objects.
Hits
FA

NegIO
0.59 (0.02)
0.48 (0.02)

NegNIO
0.37 (0.02)
0.3 (0.02)

NegFace
0.5 (0.02)
0.36 (0.02)

NeuIO
0.62 (0.02)
0.5 (0.02)

NeuNIO
0.37 (0.02)
0.32 (0.02)

NeuFace
0.5 (0.02)
0.38 (0.02)

fidence was rated on a 1-7 scale; 1 meaning “not at all confident,” and 7 meaning “extremely
confident.” These data were analyzed using 2 (Item type: interacted/non-interacted) x 2 (sound
type: negative/neutral) within-subjects ANOVAs. Examining confidence with respect to hits,
only the main effect of item type was statistically significant, F(1,122)= 42.34, p<0.01, p2
=0.26. Participants were more confident when they correctly identified an interacted object
(M=5.84) than a non-interacted object (M=5.32). Participants were significantly more confident
in responses to lures, F(1,113)=18.193, p<0.01, p2 =0.14. Participants were more confident in
their false alarms to interacted object lures (M=5.6) than in their false alarms to non-interacted
object lures (M=5.16).
Exploratory analyses on confidence ratings for face hits and FAs were also conducted.
Unlike the object confidence ratings, there were no significant differences between confidence
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ratings for negative or neutral face hits; nor were there significant differences between
confidence ratings for negative or neutral face FAs, both ps>0.90.
Discussion
It was predicted that objects involved in the action, regardless of emotion, should be
better remembered than the non-interacted object. The results were consistent with this
prediction, although the effect size was small. Participants’ attention appears to have been drawn
by the action to the object. Participants also responded more liberally to interacted objects than
non-interacted objects. The pattern for confidence paralleled the pattern for response bias.
Participants were more confident in their responses to Hits and FAs for interacted objects than
for their responses to non-interacted objects.
As predicted by ABC, the advantage of interacted over non-interacted objects should
have been greater when the actions were coupled with a negatively emotionally arousing sound
than when they were with a neutral sound. In this case, a sound type x object type interaction
would be expected. However, this prediction was not supported, as there was no evidence of
interaction regardless of the dependent measure. Furthermore, there was no overall effect of
emotional arousal on discrimination, although it did appear to influence response bias.
Participants who heard a negative sound preceding a scene responded more conservatively not
only to the objects in that scene, but also responded more conservatively to the faces as well.
Finally, overall memory performance was low, for which the issues will be addressed in the
general discussion. The goal of this experiment was to evaluate the effects of action and emotion
on memory for individual components (i.e., item memory), not the relationships between
components (i.e., object binding). This latter topic was the focus of Experiment 2.
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Experiment 2
Experiment 2 examines the extent to which associative binding is a relatively automatic
outcome of observing actions. An answer to this question influences the predictions of ABC
theory about enhancement due to emotional arousal. Specifically, ABC predicts that emotional
arousal should enhance binding when associative information is salient. If action leads people to
integrate the elements involved in the action (i.e., the actor, the interacted object), then binding
should be observed. Additionally, ABC theory predicts that emotional arousal should reduce
associations to unimportant elements in a scene (i.e., the non-interacted object). In the following
experiment, participants studied the same scenes as in Experiment 1, but were tested on the faces
of the actors in the presence or absence of test cues. Specifically, participants saw a test scene
with either the interacted object, the non-interacted object or no additional cue visible.

19

Experiment 2: Methods
Participants
A power analysis for Experiment 2 was computed using G*power (Faul et al., 2009). The
analysis suggested that the amount of participants need to achieve 80% power was 138. This
analysis assumed: a 2 (Sound type) x 3 (Cue type) within-subjects ANOVA; an ES f of 0.10
(small effect size f); and a type 1 error rate of 0.05. Participants were students taking psychology
courses at Louisiana State University and received course credit for their participation. A total of
143 students participated.
Experimental Design
A 2 (Sound type) x 3 (Cue type) within-subjects ANOVA was used. Cue type consisted
of three types: Interacted object, non-interacted object and No cue. Sound type, emotional and
neutral, was the same as Experiment 1.The dependent variable was recognition accuracy for the
Actor, measured using SDT measures (d’ and C).
Stimuli
Study phase. Stimuli identical to the study phase in Experiment 1.
Test phase. Participants saw a scene similar to one presented at study (see Figure 3 for
an example), except that everything besides the cue was blurred and the face of the actor was
covered by a green square. Below this scene was a single face (either a target or a lure).

a.

b.

Figure 3. An example of a test scene from Experiment 2. Participants saw scenes similar to (a).
Beneath was a face, similar to (b). Participants judged if the face matched the scene.
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Procedure
Experiment 2 had the same study phase as Experiment 1.
The test phase in Experiment 2 differed from Experiment 1 in that only memory for the
actor was assessed. The target person was indicated by a green square (See Fig. 3 for an example
of a test scene). In addition, there were three types of altered test scenes that varied with respect
to the type of cue that was presented. The no cue version was simply a blurred background. In
the other object cue conditions, either the interacted or non-interacted object was clearly seen
against the blurred background. Contrasts between the object cue conditions and the no cue
condition will allow for an assessment of binding between the actor’s face and the cue type. As
in Experiment 1, participants will make a yes/no recognition judgment of the face presented.
Participants were instructed to select Old if the face was presented with the scene, or new if it
was not. After each recognition judgment, participants were asked to determine how confident
they are on a 1-7 scale.
Variability in number of cue types. Due to a programming error, participants early in
data collection (n = 36) encountered different numbers of cues of each type. The number of cues
seen with were not evenly congruent with the studied scene. That is, at test, some participants did
not see an equal amount interacted object cues and non-interacted object cues. These differences
were generally small, and were accommodated in the final analysis by computing proportion of
responses per cue type. Later participants completed a revised program that did not have these
issues.
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Experiment 2: Results and Discussion
Results and Analysis
Associative binding was assessed using signal detection (SDT) measures (d’ and C), and
analyzed using 2 (Sound type) x 3 (Cue type) within-subjects ANOVAs (See Table 3 for means).
Table 3: Mean d’ and C for items divided by valence. Neg=Negative, Neu=Neutral.
d’
C

NegIO
0.23
[0.13,0.34]
-0.08
[-0.13,-0.04]

NegNIO
0.27
[0.18,0.37]
0.03
[-0.02,0.07]

NegNoCue
0.28
[0.17,0.4]
0.04
[-0.03,0.1]

NeuIO
0.22
[0.12,0.32]
-0.07
[-0.12,-0.02]

NeuNIO
0.2
[0.1,0.29]
0.06
[0.01,0.12]

NeuNoCue
0.27
[0.16,0.39]
0.04
[-0.02,0.12]

Follow-up t-tests used a Bonferroni correction. As in Experiment 1, there were no a priori
predictions for response bias (C), but these data were also reported for the sake of completeness.
Recognition discrimination (d’) in this experiment did not vary as a function of cue type,
valence type, or the interaction (all ps > .40). However, there was a main effect of cue type with
respect to response bias, F(2,141)=13.49, p<0.01, η2=0.16. Follow-up t-tests revealed more
liberal responses for faces cued with the interacted object (M=-0.22), than for faces cued with
either the non-interacted object (M=0.1; t(142)=-6.6, p<0.01) or no cue (M=0.07 t(142)=-7.13,
p<0.01).
As in Experiment 1, we also examined the confidence ratings for hits and FAs (See Table 4 for
means).
Table 4: Mean hits and FAs by cue type.

Hits
FA

NegIO
0.66 (0.02)
0.6 (0.03)

NegNIO
0.52 (0.03)
0.43 (0.03)

NegNoCue
0.51 (0.02)
0.43 (0.02)
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NeuIO
0.66 (0.03)
0.56 (0.03)

NeuNIO
0.47 (0.03)
0.39 (0.03)

NeuNoCue
0.51 (0.02)
0.43 (0.02)

A 2 (Valence) x 3 (Cue type) within-subjects ANOVA assessed participants’ confidence
ratings for both measures. There was a main effect of cue type, F(2,74)=8.35, p<0.01, η2=0.18.
Follow-up planned comparisons revealed that participants were more confident in their responses
to Hits when the face was paired with an interacted object cue (M=5.05), than when the face was
paired with either a non-interacted object (M=4.63) or no cue (M=4.6), t(132)=4.52, p<0.01;
t(141)=6.34, p<0.01. Confidence responses to false alarms revealed a similar pattern, with only a
main effect of cue type, F(2,57)=13.77, p<0.01, η2=0.33. Follow up t-tests revealed that
participants were more confident in their FA responses when the lure face was paired with an
interacted-object cue (M=4.90) than when a lure face was paired with either a non-interacted
object cue (M=4.31) or no cue (4.43), t(128)=5.51, p<0.01; t(135)=5.93, p<0.01.
Experiment 2: Discussion
The current study examined binding between the actor performing an action and the
objects present in a scene. Based on previous research (Martin, 2013), it was expected that
binding would be observed in terms of improved discrimination in the interacted object cue
condition relative to the no cue condition. There was no evidence of binding, as performance was
uniformly very low across the conditions. The low levels of performance in the task may have
been due to high similarity between the study items, between the old and lure items, or both. This
issue will be discussed in the general discussion. Additionally, ABC theory predicts that binding
should be enhanced by emotional arousal when it is a focus at encoding. There was no evidence
of an interaction of item type with emotional arousal, and as in Experiment 1, there was no
overall effect of emotional arousal on discrimination. However, it is possible that the lack of a
significant effect may be due to the very low d’ values.
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While memory was not impacted by cue type or valence, cue type impacted response
bias. Participants responded more liberally to faces that were cued by an interacted object, than
faces cued by a non-interacted object or no cue. This suggests that participants were not ignoring
the cue and were able to use it, but the interacted object was not useful enough to effectively cue
memory. In other words, participants may have not had a good representation for the face in
memory such that, while the target interacted object cues were familiar, they were not able to cue
face memory to accurately discriminate old faces from lure faces. However, the familiarity of the
interacted objects increased their willingness to call the test face old, regardless of its actual
status. Again, the pattern for confidence ratings paralleled the response bias data. Participants
were more confident in both their hits and FAs when they rated interacted objects (and lures)
than when they rated non-interacted objects (and lures).

24

General Discussion
Different factors may determine how we remember individual aspects of events and the
relationship between these components. In this research, the primary prediction was that emotion
and action would jointly affect what was remembered from a scene. Specifically, these
experiments examined whether action and emotion preferentially directed attention to relevant
stimuli, and how this influenced item and associative memory. One general prediction was that
action would capture and focus attention, ultimately creating a stronger representation of the
object and person associated with that action in memory. In addition, ABC theory (Mather &
Sutherland, 2011) predicts enhancement for both item memory and associative memory,
provided that the emotional arousal in place is not in competition with the to-be encoded stimuli.
The design of the current studies ensured that emotionally arousing information did not come
from the same modality, which eliminated the potential for competition with the visually
presented to-be remembered stimuli.
In Experiment 1, actions did serve to enhance memory for objects that were integral to
the action, which supported one hypothesis. Participants were also more confident in their
responses to old items when these items had been interacted with than when they had not.
However, there was also an effect on response criteria, as participants responded more liberally
to interacted objects, regardless if the object had been previously seen. This translated in to
higher confidence ratings for FAs for the interacted object lures as well. This may have occurred
because the action made objects similar to the target object more familiar, leading to a liberal
response bias. However, a clear interpretation of this shift in bias is made difficult by the fact
that differences were also found in d’. Finally, although participants were able to discriminate
old interacted objects from lure interacted objects better than old and lure non-interacted objects,
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this enhancement may have been larger if the studied objects were less similar from their lures
and other objects. To wit, the scenes that participants saw involved 36 people from, roughly, the
same demographic; and 72 hand-held items. Additionally, despite the change in background, all
of the scenes took place in a similar setting. Interference from previous scenes may have started
to build-up, effectively reducing the fidelity of memories of faces and objects.
Also in Experiment 1, it was predicted that the advantage of interacted over noninteracted objects would be greater when the actions were preceded by a negative, emotionally
arousing sound. This prediction, which stemmed from ABC Theory, was not supported.
Although the predicted interaction was not obtained, there was a main effect of emotional
arousal on response bias. Participants were more conservative in their responses to items
associated with a negative sound. Because there were no overt cues on the test to signal whether
an item had been studied with an emotional versus a neutral sound, this suggests that participants
may have remembered associated information about the item even though emotional arousal did
not influence memory for the item itself. In addition, the findings are somewhat unusual as it is
not uncommon to see emotional arousal lead to liberal criterion shifts in recognition (e.g.,
Dougal & Rotello, 2007). However, conclusions about ABC theory and the nature of the
response criteria shift may be a function of the very low levels of discrimination that were
observed.
While Experiment 1 only examined item memory, Experiment 2 examined associative
memory. It was predicted that binding would be observed between the actor and the interacted
object, resulting in better face memory when a face was cued with an interacted object. Again, in
line with ABC Theory, this effect should be enhanced under negative emotional arousal. There
was no evidence of enhanced binding due to action nor was there an effect of emotional arousal
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on discrimination in this experiment. However, discrimination was extremely low for all
conditions. Actions did influence response bias and confidence ratings. Participants responded
more liberally to faces that were cued with an interacted object than faces that were cued with a
non-interacted object, or did not have a cue. Participants were also more confident in their
responses to faces that were cued with an interacted object (hits and FAs). Thus, the familiarity
of the interacted object cue did appear to influence decision criteria, but was likely not strong
enough to help recover a clear memory for the face. Thus, the lack of a binding effect here is
likely due to poor memory for the constituent components (faces and objects).
The poor discrimination observed in Experiments 1 and 2 are likely due to choice of
stimuli, as both experiments utilized the same faces and objects. The difficulty participants had
in making these discriminations are likely to due to the similarity of faces and objects across the
different scenes, the similarity of target and lure items at test, or both. Future efforts will focus
on decreasing this similarity. In addition, one option is to use shorter study-test blocks in the
future. Not only would this help reduce the build-up of proactive interference, but would also
shorten the time between study and test, which may increase performance. Finally, actions may
not automatically draw attention to both the actor and the item, but perhaps the item only. If this
is the case, then a top-down goal to integrate the actor and the item may be necessary to observe
binding.
This study is a first attempt to explore the effects of action and emotional arousal on
item and associative memory. Although there was evidence that actions draw attention to objects
(Exp. 1), the effects on item memory were small. Answers to questions about the interactive
effect of emotional arousal, and the effects of both variables on binding, are less clear due to the
poor levels of discrimination observed. Tests of these questions will await future research that
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strengthens the materials and design used in the current experiments. Additional tools might also
be useful in exploring this topic, such as utilizing oculomotor measures including eye tracking
and pupillometry to disentangle the effects that emotion and action exert on attentional
mechanisms. In addition, research that focuses on building a deeper theoretical understanding of
the cross-modal memorial effects of auditory stimuli will also be critical. Future work should
explore how sounds interact with visual stimuli when simultaneously presented and determine
how the sound is ultimately bound to the scene. Altogether, the goal of increasing our
understanding of how scene components are represented in memory, and how emotional arousal
can influence these representations is an important one, with both theoretical and potentially
applied implications.
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